

Exhibit A

From: Marilyn Marks, Coalition for Good Governance <marilyn@uscgg.org>
Sent: Tuesday, August 3, 2021 4:38:04 PM
To:
Subject: Facing Critical Decisions on Upcoming Municipal Elections



August 3, 2021

Dear Georgia Official,

All officials involved in November's municipal elections or any county election have ***urgent crucial decisions*** to make on how the election should be conducted in the face of now unassailable scientific evidence that touchscreen BMD elections are not secure.

In our Curling v. Raffensperger BMD lawsuit (the same lawsuit in which the DREs were declared unconstitutional), Plaintiffs' experts' rebuttal reports were submitted last night to attorneys for the Secretary of State, the State Election Board and the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections. [Dr. Halderman's report](#) is of urgent concern, and discloses the fact that his 25,000 word initial report (under seal by court order) discloses "serious vulnerabilities" and the "steps for exploiting those vulnerabilities to alter individual votes and election outcomes in Georgia." He goes on to say:

4. In my report—a 25,000-word document that is the product of twelve weeks of intensive testing of the Dominion equipment provided by Fulton County—I find that Georgia’s BMDs contains multiple severe security flaws. Attackers could exploit these flaws to install malicious software, either with temporary physical access (such as that of voters in the polling place) or remotely from election management systems. I explain in detail how such malware, once installed, could alter voters’ votes while subverting all the procedural protections practiced by the State, including acceptance testing, hash validation, logic and accuracy testing, external firmware validation, and risk-limiting audits (RLAs). Finally, I describe working proof-of-concept malware that I am prepared to demonstrate in court.

You can read his [highly summarized report here](#), but Dr. Halderman’s original detailed report is sealed by the court to avoid publicly disclosing the details of the many ways to exploit the BMD system in undetectable attacks. He also offered to prepare a more detailed but [abridged report for the public](#). [Dr. Halderman’s expertise and credentials](#) in voting system security are unquestioned. He is frequently called to testify in Congress when national security interests of voting system security are under consideration.

Additionally [Dr. Philip Stark](#) and [Dr. Andrew Appel](#) also submitted compelling important reports [here](#) and [here](#) on why the BMD results cannot be audited.

Given these dire warnings from the nation’s top experts, it is incumbent on local officials to reconsider their use of BMDs this fall, and instead use hand marked paper ballots with voluntary robust audits. The local boards have full authority to use hand marked paper ballots in **municipal elections**. (O.C.G.A. §21-2-300(a)(2))

Additionally a county board always has the right to choose hand marked ballots in **any election** if the use of the voting system is impossible or impracticable. (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-281) It’s hard to imagine more “impracticable” conditions than the serious flaws that Dr. Halderman found exist in Georgia’s BMDs.

We sometimes hear officials say, “The BMDs worked fine during 2020. We didn’t have a problem.” That reflects a lack of understanding that the high risk attacks are silent and undetectable. No one would know if there were such manipulation, and it would be virtually impossible to find out now.

We urge you to take immediate steps to plan to conduct hand marked paper ballot elections, counted by optical scanner and audited with statistically valid audits by sample hand counts. For small municipal elections, hand counting is feasible and a very transparent process, and has been the choice of many Georgia cities for years.

In June, Dr. Halderman, [Dr. Richard DeMillo](#), Free Speech for People and CGG hosted a [webinar explaining](#) why BMD elections are insecure. We urge you to watch at least the opening session with Dr. Halderman as you consider the options for the upcoming elections.

We are happy to provide more information. Just drop us a line.


Thank you for your service to Georgia voters.

Marilyn Marks, Executive Director

[Coalition for Good Governance](#)

Marilyn@USCGG.org

704. 292. 9802



Coalition for Good Governance is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization focused on election security, integrity, and transparency.

CGG | Board Secretary, 1520 Cress Court, Boulder, CO 80304

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